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Abstract—Timely detection of a malicious piece of code accu-
rately, in an enterprise network or in an individual device, before
it propagates and mutate itself, is one of the most challenging
tasks in the domain of cyber security. Millions of variants of each
latest malware are released every day and each of these variants
have a unique static signature. Conventional anti-malware tools
use signatures and static heuristics of malware to segregate them
from legitimate files, which is not an effective technique because
of the number of malware variants released every passing day.
To overcome the fundamental flaw of operational techniques,
we propose a framework that generalizes the static and dynamic
malware features that are used to train multiple machine learning
algorithms. The generalization of clean and malicious features
enables the framework to accurately differentiate between clean
and malicious files.
Index Terms—Malware, ML and Malware Detection, Malware
Analysis, Machine Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of malware over the past decade and their
lethal proliferation has conspicuously challenged the effective-
ness of anti-malware packages and other security mechanisms.
Millions of malware variants are released every day that are
modified versions of older malware and a vast majority of
these variants are able to bypass the security mechanisms
quite easily. Malware authors release their code, along with
variant engines, which not only enable anyone, even with less
programming knowledge, to generate their own version of an
older malware. This approach is the reason behind exponential
rise in malware propagation across the internet, it also makes
it significantly harder for the current security mechanisms to
eliminate or even mitigate the damage caused by such attacks.
The lack of novelty, improvisation, and excess amount
of resource consumption are the foundational problems of
current anti-malware packages. The general defence mecha-
nisms faced by modern malware, which have the capability to
dynamically mutate while propagating, is somewhat limited
and predictable. The defence mechanism conventionally used
is based around signature and heuristics detection, raising
flags against defined rules, and traffic monitoring. All of
the characteristics of defence mechanisms, commonly imple-
mented in combination, are quite predictable and malware
with polymorphic and metamorphic capabilities are evolving
at such a pace that it is nearly impossible detect them with
such predictable techniques.
Polymorphic malware continuously change their appearance
while keeping the primary functionality intact. Most of these
malware use encryption to pack the core functionality, which
avoids any reverse engineering or heuristics-based analysis to
be performed on the malicious code. Polymorphic malware
carry a number of mutation engines (MtE), which are not
malware themselves and do not possess any malicious code
that raise any red flags by security mechanisms. The sole
purpose of these MtEs is to change or mutate the encrypted
stub of malware that contains the core functionality. When the
stub is evolved by an MtE the old stub is deleted and the new
one takes charge, this process is performed quite frequently,
which gives very little time to the security mechanisms to
identify and stop the malicious code before it is changed.
This paper presents a dynamic characteristic’ building
framework supported by a unique combination of machine
learning algorithms that are trained and tested against 2 million
malicious files and more than hundred thousand clean files.
This enables the framework to not only identify the variants of
analyzed malware, but also enables the framework to dynami-
cally form characteristics in real-time to differentiate between
clean and malicious files effectively, without consuming a
noticeable amount of system or network resources.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; section II
presents the critical evaluation of the related research and
their effectiveness while section III discuss the anatomy of be-
havioural characteristics generation. In section IV, we present
our continuous learning framework, which learns from cus-
tomized combination of behavioural characteristics. In section
V, we discuss the experiment setup, training of algorithms
(through customized behavioural characteristics), along with
the critical evaluation of results. Finally paper is concluded in
section VI.
II. EVALUATION OF EXISTING TECHNIQUES
Combination of dynamic malware analysis techniques and
machine learning tools proves to be a power full duo for mal-
ware classification and identification. However, most machine
learning based malware identification methods are excessively
feature dependent. It is very challenging to identify effective
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feature from huge available data sets. To combat this chal-
lenge, deep learning based malware detection systems are
also getting popular. Deep learning performs effective and
automatic feature selection by replacing handcrafted feature
selection. However, deep learning classification systems are
vulnerable to adversarial learning-based attacks. Therefore,
intelligent techniques need to be implemented for adversarial
attacks in dynamic malware analysis. Despite of these chal-
lenges of effective feature selection and adversarial attacks,
in a nutshell machine learning based malware classification
works better than the static counterpart; by performing in
depth scanning and emulating all the files in the anti-malware
engine. Various machine learning algorithms used for dynamic
malware classification, identification and detection is presented
in [1], [2], [3].
Authors in [4], used Naı¨ve Bayes, k nearest neighbor (kNN),
J48 decision trees, sequential minimal optimization (SMO),
and the RBF classifier, to evaluate the accuracy provided by
these classifiers. Combination of malware and non-malwrae
was fed for classification into these classifiers, after feature
vector selection. Their feature vector contained 52,236 fea-
tures, grouped four categories; System Calls, Registry Edits,
File Modifications, and DLLs. kNN was proven to have best
average accuracy with 81 percent correctly classified.
In [5], authors presented a cognitive framework to detect
the presence of polymorphic malware, inside a Microsoft
Windows host. They performed fractal analysis by utilizing
a process tree based temporal directed graph. First fractal
analysis is performed for finding patterns( cognitively distin-
guishable)in the malicious processes followed by formation of
process tree graph to characterize malware.
In [6], authors implement various adversarial
attacks/defenses for deep learning based dynamic malware
analysis classification systems. They used six different
crafting techniques for adversarial malware samples used
for removing malicious features and evaluated the efficacy
of distillation defense and ensemble defense systems for
dynamic analysis-based, deep malware classification; and
demonstrate the superiority of the later.
In [7], a machine learning model is presented to capture
the complex patterns of polymorphic malware and benign
files. This model uses logistic regression with ANOVA F-Test
and snort. Authors used Kali linux as an attacker to generate
polymorphic malware and windows xp system as a vulnerable
one. They used logistic regression with ANOVA F-Test for
classification ans deployment of significant features into snort
IDS, and Polymorphic malware is detected.
Without lost of generality, another types of malware at-
tacks which are significantly damaging enterprise business
are Ransomware, such as WannaCry Ransomware. Authors
in [8] analyzed and presented the implementation of machine
learning algorithms for Ransomware classification based on
malware’s feature behavioural analysis. They extracted be-
haviour attributes from ransomware samples obtained from
behavioral analysis reports ( VirusTotal). These attributes were
further refined for optimal classification, by using iterative
approach. Afterwards they evaluated classification accuracy
of J48 and Decision Tree algorithm ( available in WEKA).
In the same spirit, authors in [9], [10], developed and pre-
sented method for discriminating feature identification of
Ransomware and framework for analysis and detection of
Ransomware using machine learning models and performing
feature extraction, respectively. Most of the work in features
extraction/ classification and reporting of malware detection is
done using these well known ML algorithms such as; SVM,
J48, Random Forest, LASSO and Ridge Regularization, in
[11], [12] respectively. For instance, authors in [13] introduced
a model for detection of polymorphic malware by monitoring
system calls, using SVM algorithm. While authors in [14]
used KNN and SVM for development of a framework for
ML based malware detection in mobile devices. Authors used
app’s manifest and source code for feature extraction and
afterwards performed classification of good ware and malware,
by retrofitting ML algorithms during training and testing.
1) Critical Evaluations and Our Contribution: Most of
the work for malware analysis, either consider static analysis
or dynamic analysis based on some specific feature catego-
rization. Static analysis turns to be in-efficient method for
sophisticated malware analysis due to incomplete behaviour
analysis, while dynamic analysis being highly dependent upon
feature selection can leads to false results. False positive and
false negative results are expected as change in the feature set
will divert the trained algorithm to fall for wrong analysis.
Keeping in view of limitations of existing malware analysis
techniques, we propose a framework comprised of custom
category generation with a combination of benign as well
as malicious features forming a category. Each category is
comprised of a combination of clean and malicious features,
which means that even if there is a change in behavioural
features, the end result will not be altered. This is the unique
feature of our proposed framework and a clear distinction be-
tween our approach and the ones discussed earlier (comprised
of feature-based machine learning algorithms). Previously dis-
cussed techniques, train and test machine learning algorithms
on specific feature retrieved through different means, which
makes it quite reliant those features and changes in those
features can considerably divert the trained algorithms to
generate a significant number of false-positives and false-
negatives in their results.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK MODEL
Our framework is comprised of custom category generation,
based on behavioural features of both benign and malicious
Portable Executable (PE) files. The idea behind this custom
categorization is to combine the behavioural feature set and
generalize them in a category that can be scaled if there are
more relevant features in the dataset.
A. Framework Architecture
The architecture of the proposed framework is divided into
multiple layers as shown in Figure 1. Each layer is dedicated
to produce specific results that are used by the following layer.
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Fig. 1. Architectural Flow
Each layer deals with the data from both clean and malicious
files.
• Layer 1 –Analysis Layer: The Analysis Layer performs a
thorough analysis of clean and malicious files and store
the analysis results in separate repositories, both type of
files are analyzed in the same manner, which means that
the reports generated are in the same format and follow
the same conventions
• Layer 2 –Category Layer: The Category Layer divides
the feature-sets in meaningful categories that are present
in both the file types, along with associating the related
occurrences. The associations are then sent to the third
layer
• Layer 3 –Existence Layer: The Existence Layer sepa-
rates the instances in which each feature occurred in
the behavioural analysis, along with the related sets.
Intersection of both malicious and clean features is taken,
along with the complement of both M & C. It is then sent
to layer 4
• Layer 4 –Machine Learning Layer: The machine learning
layer retrieves the customized dataset and applies ten-fold
cross-validation to remove any bias. It then uses Support
Vector Machine, Decision Tree, and Boosting on Decision
Tree to train and test the framework
1) Categorization Strategy: The illustration of the layered
framework presents a functionality breakdown of each layer
and what they produce, along with their significance. As
highlighted earlier, the first layer, which is the analysis layer,
possess the analysis datasets of clean and malicious files. As
discussed in the previous section, this dataset is generated as
a result of thorough static and behavioural analysis of clean
and malicious files and stored in a standardized JSON file
format. The functionality of second layer is quite pivotal in
this framework, which is the category layer. Each category
layer stores the feature-set in five different features, namely;
Network, CPU Usage, Dropper Files, API; Noti API, Certi
API, Processes; Processes Generated, as shown in Figure 2.
Additionally, API and Processes categories have subcategories;
API Name & Frequency and Processes Deleted and Names,
respectively. All these categories store the respective extracted
features from both clean and malicious files. The primary
reason behind categorizing the features and combining the
extracted features is to generalize different behavioural pat-
terns in clean and malicious files. Along with categorizing
specific behavioural features, this layer links these generalized
categories with two subcategories that are derived from Cat4
API and Cat5 Processes. The subcategories derived from Cat4
and Cat5 are also connected with first three categories; Net-
work, CPU Usage, Dropper Files. The primary reason behind
connecting the subcategories of Cat4 & 5 with other categories
is the relevance of APIs and Processes with Network, CPU
Usage, Dropper Files is quite significant and have a noticeable
impact on these three categories. Category 4.1 holds the
information about a specific API and its frequency. When
Category 4.1 is linked with Cat1, it identifies the frequency
of occurrence of a specific API with respect network traffic.
It is then linked with Cat2 and the frequency of occurrence
of a specific API and its impact on CPU consumption is
monitored. Finally, it is linked with Cat3 and the association of
dropping new files in a networked environment or in a single
computer with the occurrence of a specific API. Moreover,
Category 5.1, which is Processes Deleted and Name, is also
associated with first three categories. The association of Cat1
with Cat5.1 monitors the name of processes deleted in a
networked environment by a specific process. The association
of Cat2 with Cat5.1 monitors the name of a specific process, its
impact on CPU consumption and whether it replaced a specific
process and their previous and current CPU consumption.
Additionally, the association of Cat3 with Cat5.1 monitor the
files dropped or deleted by a specific process, along with their
locations.
2) Existence Identification: Layer 3 is the existence layer,
which integrates the categories, as illustrated in the category
layer and takes intersection and complement to identify and
differentiate the instance of each category for both clean and
malicious feature-set. As mentioned in the previous section,
the association of Cat1 with Cat4.1 and 5.1, for both clean
and malicious feature-set, identify the existence with respect
to Cat1. The later phase takes the intersection of existence
between clean and malicious features from customized cat-
egories, along with a complement of malicious features in
clean feature-set and complement of clean features malicious
feature-set. The contents of final categories 1-5 are based
on the intersection and complement of the aforementioned
feature-set, as illustrated in figure. It is pivotal for the op-
erational efficacy of the framework to include common and
unique behavioural features of clean and malicious files,
which will enable the framework to identify polymorphic
and metamorphic malware. As discussed earlier, these types
of malware dynamically evolve and attach themselves with
legitimate files, as they propagate. Having a generalized com-
bination of behavioural feature of clean and malicious files
not only enables the framework to distinguish between clean
and malicious files, it specifically empowers the framework
against legitimate files that have malicious code embedded in
it.
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Fig. 2. Architecture of Layered Framework
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we present the implementation details of our
proposed framework. This framework is specifically designed
for Portable Executable (PE) files, also known as .exe files,
which are specific to windows environment. Therefore, all the
files used in this research are windows-based executable, both;
clean and malicious. The operations of every system or its
implementation is based on a set of rules, which define the
conditions of its functionalities and the parameters involved
in their operations. The pseudocode presented in this section
elaborates the condition that make this framework unique and
efficient as compared to the ones discussed earlier.
As presented in the pseudocode, RepoC and RepoM hold
the static and dynamic features of clean and malicious files
respectively, acquired through static and dynamic analysis of
both type of P.E files. This leads to the existence module,
which has three different phases; Categorization, Existence,
and Combination. In the categorization phase, the union of
clean and malicious features comprised of; network behaviour,
CPU usage, dropped files, APIs, processes generated are stored
in Cat1, Cat2, Cat3, Cat4, and Cat5 respectively. The final
version of each category after this step stores the union of
both clean and malicious features of each category mentioned
earlier.
In the existence phase of this module, the virtually con-
nected features, as shown earlier in the figure, are combined
together. The union of Cat4 and Cat5 is combined with
separately with the set of each category; Cat1, 2, 3, 4, 5. This
combines the individual features of each category with the
hierarchical features of Cat4 and 5, which involves both clean
and malicious files. The combination phase of the existence
module is the final phase and the information retrieved from
this phase is used to train and test the machine learning
algorithms in the next phase. In this phase, common features
from both; clean and malicious feature-set are identified and
stored in a separate set. The whole idea behind this step
is to identify the differences a polymorphic malware makes
to a legitimate file. The identification of common features
and features exclusive to clean and malicious files enable
Algorithm 1 Malware Analysis
1: Input: C, M
2: Output: Cat 1, Cat 2, . . ., Cat n
3: C←Set of Clean P.E Files
4: M←Set of Malicious P.E Files
5: while c ∈ C do
6: while m ∈ M do
7: S ← StaticAnalysis(c,m)
8: D ← DynamicAnalysis(c,m)
9: Repo C← Repo C ∪ {Cs ∪ CD}
10: Repo M← Repo M ∪ {Ms ∪MD}
11: Existence Module – Categorization
12: Cat 1 ←Cat 1 ∪ {RepoCNet ∪RepoMNet}
13: Cat 2 ←Cat 2 ∪ {RepoCCPU ∪RepoMCPU}
14: Cat 3 ← Cat 3 ∪ {RepoCfiles ∪RepoMfiles}
15: Cat 4 ← Cat 4 ∪ {RepoCAPI ∪RepoMAPI}
16: Cat 5 ← Cat 5 ∪ {RepoCpros ∪RepoMpros}
17: Existence Module - Existence
18: Cat 1←Cat 1 ∪ {Cat4 ∪ Cat5}
19: Cat 2←Cat 2 ∪ {Cat4 ∪ Cat5}
20: Cat 3←Cat 3 ∪ {Cat4 ∪ Cat5}
21: Cat 4←Cat 4 ∪ {Cat4 ∪ Cat5}
22: Cat 5←Cat 5 ∪ {Cat4 ∪ Cat5}
23: Existence Module - Combination
24: Malfeat ← Set of Malicious Features
25: Cleanfeat ← Set of Clean Features,
26: while Malfeat ∈ (Cat 1,2,3,4,5) do
27: while Cleanfeat ∈ (Cat 1,2,3,4,5) do
28: Cat 1.1 ← Cat1.1∪ {Cat1Malfeat ∩
Cat1Cleanfeat}
29: .
30: .
31: Cat 5.1 ← Cat5.1∪ {Cat1Malfeat ∩
Cat1Cleanfeat}
32: end while
33: end while
34: end while
35: end while
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the algorithm to differentiate even the slightest embedding of
malicious code in a legitimate file. In the proliferation process
in a single machine or in a network, multiple executables are
used as hosts. In such a scenario, every executable even with
a slightest of mutation needs to be identified before it can pass
the mutation to the next executable. This technique will enable
the algorithm to differentiate between clean and malicious files
with significantly high accuracy.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As the experiments are windows-based malware, Ubuntu
is chosen as the host environment. The modules containing;
clean and malicious files repositories, customized static anal-
ysis tool, Cuckoo sandboxed environment, repository layer
comprised of clean and malicious files’ analysis reports. The
existence layer is programmed in Python and connected with
the previous two layers. The Python program is comprised
of two modules; the existence layer and the machine learning
layer. The existence layer connects with the file system, which
holds the analysis reports and after performing the operations
as discussed in the implementation section. It passes the
finalized parameters to the next module that holds multiple
machine learning algorithms that are trained and tested using
these parameters.
File Type Quantity
Benign 121523
Malicious 2068796
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF BENIGN AND MALICIOUS FILES IN DATASET
Table I presents the distribution of clean and malicious
files that are used for static and dynamic analysis, along with
populating the feature-set in the existence layer that is later
used for training and testing of algorithms. The large number
of malware used in the experiment ensures that the framework
is highly accurate and eliminate the existence of false-positives
in the results. Also, the majority of the malware present in the
dataset are variants of highly advanced polymorphic malware
that have the ability to forge their presence as clean files, while
propagating. Additionally, the dataset is comprised of different
types of malware families, as shown in Table II This also
enables the framework to be more thorough when it comes
to detection of different types of malware, along with the
malware that share features from other malware families.
Malware Type Percentage
Trojan 65.82%
Adware 22.67%
Worm 8.66%
Virus 1.21%
Downloader 0.56%
Spyware 0.41%
Exploit 0.39%
Dropper 0.28%
TABLE II
MALWARE DISTRIBUTION IN THE REPOSITORY
A. Results
In order to identify the effectiveness of the proposed
framework, the initial experiment was performed on the same
dataset but without the customization and categorization of
the dynamic feature-set of clean and malicious files. In the
first experiment, the same dataset of clean and malicious files
was used. The features were generated using the same static
and dynamic analysis tools and combined together to form
a rich set of features. The primary idea behind the initial
experiment was to identify the effectiveness of the combination
of machine learning algorithms without using the taxonomy-
based detection technique.
The results illustrated in Figure 3, present the comparison
of different machine learning algorithms used in the frame-
work that are trained and tested against the rich feature-set
acquired from clean and malicious files without applying the
categorization techniques. As illustrated in figure, the trained
algorithms were able to detect malware with a decent rate
but the rate still provide malware with an opportunity to
escape detection, especially in real-time situations. SVM and
decision tree were able to provide an accuracy of 0.79 and
0.60 respectively. However, when boosting was applied on the
results of decision tree, the accuracy went up to 0.91, which is
significantly higher than the actual accuracy of decision tree
but still not an optimum solution for polymorphic malware.
The same dataset was then used on the proposed framework,
which has the same set of tools for static and dynamic analysis
for clean and malicious files. However, when the rich feature-
set from the analysis layer is generated, it is then reduced to
a taxonomy discussed in earlier sections and then combined
with relevant features. The experiment performed using the
hypothesis proposed at the start and implementation discussed
in the earlier section, produced the results presented in figure.
The results illustrated in Figure 4, present the outcome of
the evaluation of the proposed framework. Once the afore-
mentioned algorithms were trained against the customised
characteristics, the detection accuracy significantly improved
Fig. 3. AUC for Basic Characteristics
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Fig. 4. Customized Characteristics
as compared to the previous results without custom charac-
teristics. Decision tree and SVM demonstrated an accuracy of
0.95 each. After applying boosting on decision tree’s results,
the outcome was significantly enhanced and the framework
was able to differentiate between clean and malicious files with
absolute accuracy. The most important aspect in this scenario
is the real-time detection based on the dynamic behaviour.
The detection was not just based on static file system, it
was based on the malware executed in a live environment,
which makes the absolute accuracy even more significant. It is
quite important to identify the importance of this evaluation,
performed on the proposed framework. The dataset used in
this evaluation was based on more than 2.1 million files, which
means that any result acquired went through a detailed analysis
of a significantly large number of features that populated
the categorization process. This means the final feature-set
acquired after the categorization process was thoroughly rich
and was comprised of precise characteristics that enhanced the
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
To cater the problem of rapid malware evolution in modern
malware, which are equipped with dynamic evasion techniques
that enable the malware to continuously keep changing its
appearance, code sequence, and even logic in some scenarios,
there is a significant requirement of detection techniques that
have the similar dynamics embedded in them. The framework
proposed in this paper, not only has the capability to detect
malware, it can has the capability to accurately differentiate
between clean and malicious files. The proposed framework
is primarily designed for polymorphic malware that have self-
mutation properties and can attach themselves dynamically to
multiple legitimate files, which means that the characteristics
of the framework discussed in this paper can accurately
differentiate between the legitimate and malware host files.
The machine learning algorithms used are trained and tested
on specially customised feature-set acquired from a quite large
dataset of clean and malicious files. The end result illustrate
the absolute accuracy of the framework against large set of
accuracy of the overall framework.
polymorphic malware. Even though, the proposed framework
demonstrated accuracy in malware identification, it is required
to scale it to a level where it can cater the needs of a
network. The modern polymorphic malware specifically target
enterprise network, which means that any solution proposed
should cover the domain of an enterprise network. In order
to enhance the effectiveness of this framework, it is crucial to
scale it to the level of an enterprise network and evaluate its
effectiveness.
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